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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CATHARINE S. GIBBONS, 
Plaintiff and .A.ppellant 
-YS-
BYRON BRIMM~ and ,vife 
HILD..._~ .lt, BRIMM, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 7596 
.. A_PPELLANT 'S 
REPLY BRIEF 
ST.A.TEJIE~TT OF FACTS 
Respondents in their brief devote considerable space 
in a discussion of the relationship bet\veen plaintiff and 
Hilda Brirmn. That there 'vas a bond of affection 
resembling that of mother and daughter. Defendants 
attempt to strengthen their case 'vith the contention that 
Hilda had done so much for Catherine in past years. 
But the evidence also sho,vs that Catharine practically 
reared Hilda fro1n childhood, assisted her through 
school, including college. (Tr. 473) But this is ilnnla-
terial, bceause the defendants' defense depends entirely 
upon whether they performd the contract to care for 
and 1naintain the plaintiff as they agreed to on Jan-
uar~· 25, 1949. 
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Counsel states that plaintiff had always promised 
that upon her death Hilda should inherit what she had, 
and that she actually n1ade out her will giving all her 
}Jropert~' to Hilda, and upon such promises being n1ade, 
Hilda conveyed her 1/9th interest in the property to the 
pla1ntiff. ']~his statement is untrue. Hilda conveyed 
the 1/9th interest in the fall of 194 7. And the will 
\Ya~ rnade during the summer of 1948, and after the de-
fendants began living \vith the plaintiff. And this \vill 
\\'a~ made on condition that plaintiff could live with 
the defendants and that they \Vould care for and support 
her during the remainder of her life. It was this will, 
as defendants pretended that plaintiff did not want to 
probate because it 'vas too costly. In fact, the will 
"~as n1erged into the deed and bill of sale, (Exs. "Q" 
an(l "lT".) 
Defendants contend that friction bet,veen plain-
tiff and defendant Brimm, developed as a result of the 
John C. Anderson deal, but this is emphatically denied 
by the plaintiff. (Tr. 88, 89) Hilda testified that 
plaintiff was unable to acco1npany them to Logan, but 
told Hilda that whatever terms she and Byron decided 
on ,vould be agreeable to plaintiff. Is it conceivable 
that after plaintiff, according to Hilda's testimony, had 
advised defendants that she \vould be satisfied with the 
terms ,vhich they agreed upon, that she would then 
co1nplain about it~ What could plaintiff possibly gain 
from that~ Plaintiff positively denied that she made 
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any co1nplaint about the pr1et' paid for the ,John C. 
~\nderson interest in thP property. 
It is further subn1itted that 1nost of the ~taten1ent~ 
Inade in defendant ·s brief through pages 1-7 relate to 
a period of ti1ne prior to the 1nonth of ,July 1949. 
Counsel also states that during this period the parties 
lived happily together. It is adn1itted that during this 
period the defendants "·ere friendly to the plaintiff, 
and treated her kindly and \vere considerate of her 
'velfare. It \vas covering this period of time when de-
fendants' witnesses- Ethel Piper, Hazel Hoeft, and 
Edward Hoeft-testified to. None of them paid a visit 
to the apartment during fall and 'vinter of 1949-50. 
(Tr. 332-353) According to the record, the witness, 
Ruby Keeler, was the only witness who saw the plaintiff, 
or visited the apartment from September 1, 1949, to 
February 10, 1950. And plaintiff testified that Ruby 
came occasionally to the apartment at lunch time, to 
assist plaintiff in preparing lunch. But these visits 
were not regular. Otherwise, plaintiff remained alone 
in the apartment from 7:45 a.m. to 5 o'clock p.m., every 
day but Saturday and Sunday. 
Plaintiff testified that during July, 1949, the de-
fendant, Byron Brimm, began to manifest towards plain-
tiff an arrogant and overbearing attitude, (Tr. 88), 
and fro1n that time until February 10, 1950, he absolutely 
failed to show any concern for plaintiff's welfare. In 
fact, he absented himself entirely from the plaintiff. 
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( r:r'r. 89) And the evidence · shows that his conduct 
also affected 1-Iilda adversely against plaintiff, because 
during this period of time she 'vas cross and irritable 
'vith plaintiff. 
1'he foregoing conclusively shows that the plaintiff 
\ra~ not a difficult person to live with, otherwise she 
'vould likely have created trouble during the first year 
that she lived with the defendants. The witness, I\1rs. 
Thornton, testified that the plaintiff was not hard to 
ltandle (Tr. 198), but on the contrary, she worked along 
with ~irs. Thornton very nicely. ~Irs. Thornton also 
testified (Tr. 187) that when plaintiff first came to her 
home she was nervous and afraid to do anything for 
fear !irs. Thornton 'vould criticize her. This indicates 
that Hilda had been cross, critical and irritable with 
plaintiff and had failed to be congenial, co-operative and 
fTiendly with her. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The Court erred in making its Finding of Facts 
No. 1-that plaintiff, ''was at all times capable and com-
petent in all respects to transact business,'' and the 
Court erred in making its finding No. 10, and its Con-
clusions and Decree. 
Respondents concede that the question pertaining 
to the facts and circumstances surrounding the trans-
action of January 25, 1949, 'vhen the deed and bill of 
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sale "~ere executed, ··"·a~ not 'vhether therP 'vas an 
agree1nent het~v·een the partie~~ but \Yho the partiPs 'vere, 
and "·hat 'vn~ the agree1nent.'" In this connection it i~ 
re~pectfully snb1nitted that defendant~ have atteu1pted 
by their pleading8 and 0Yidence to 1nake . 1nuch of the 
fact that BYron Briunn neYer solicited or n1ade an\'" 
~ . 
pro1nise to plaintiff nor "·as any conYeyance 1nade to 
hiln. It is rather significant that it 'vas Attorney Dick-
en~~ Byron ·s friend of four or fiv-e years standing, "·ho 
prepared the deed and bill of sale. It 'vas also Byron 
"·ho caine to l~ogan and called at the writer's office 
to procure the description of the property contained in 
the deed and. bill of sale of January 25, 1949. vVhen 
he procured this description, he returned to Ogden and 
inuuediately had I\Ir. Dickens, his close friend prepare 
the deed and bi~l of sale. Plaintiff testified that they 
had urged her to convey the property to Hilda on several 
prior occasions, but she hesitated. (Tr. 150, 151) It 
therefore appears that it \Vas Byron Brimm who engin-
eered this transaction. Yet counsel contends that Byron 
Brimm 'vas .... an uninterested party. 
The activity of defendant Brimm in procuring the 
execution of the deed and bill of sale is somewhat colu-
parable to that of J. H. Ward, in the Ward case, (85 
P. 2d. 635) as sho,vn by the following language set forth 
in the opinion (page 637) viz.,-'' Appe~lant's claim to 
an interest in the property in question arises, if at all, 
out of the tern1s of the 'vill n1ade at his request, if not 
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actual dictation.'' 
Defendant~ admit in their pleadings, evidence and 
In respondent's brief, (page 10), that -''Hilda never 
<lenied there \vas an agreement. She and other's re-
pPate<lly testified that there always was an agreement 
or understanding as to 'vhy the several contracts and 
transfers were made.'' It thus appears that the allega-
tions in pararaph five of plaintiff's amended complaint 
a rP conceded. 
Defendants also concede that they paid no money 
consideration for this property. (Tr. 112) The sole 
consideration 'vas their agreement to live with, support, 
and care for the plaintiff for the remainder of her nat-
ural life, and pay for her burial. ( Tr. 112) This is 
co needed in respondent's brief, and Counsel concedes 
that the "crux of the trial went rather to the broad 
question of performance.'' 
Counsel's comment (page 12 repsondent's brief) 
on the second paragraph of appellent's brief ( pages 
19-20 ) is clearly erroneous. There is a clear attempt 
on his part to inject a foreign matter into the subject 
viz.-the comparison between the facts in this and the 
''7 ard case. ( 85 P. 2d. 635). Of course, Counsel would 
like to divert from the point discussed on pages 19-20 
of appellant's brief because there is a strong resenl-
blance in the facts and circumstances between this, and 
the Ward case. 
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In thi~ connection it ~hould be rP1nen1bered that the 
~ trial court ruled in faY or of ~r rs. ''r ard, \\~hich \VHH 
t1 proper under the eYideneP in that case. And this Court 
affirn1ed the trial court,~ j u d g 111 en t. It Is re-
spectfully subn1itted that by the great \veight of the 
,_ eYidence, if not the undisputed evidence, in the case at 
bar, the trial court should have follo\ved the decision 
rendered in the ,, .... ard case . 
.. A .. nd it is also respectfully subn1itted that J-udge 
\\ ... olfe ·s conclusion as set out on page 13 of respondent's 
~ brief \\~as correct as it applied to the evidence and hold-
_ ing of the trial court in the Ward case. 
Respondent's counsel on pages 13 and 1±, of his brief 
· contends that the facts in \Vard case and the instant 
case are not similar. For similarity of the agreements 
in the hvo cases and, the reliance upon the agreen1ents 
by Mrs. Ward, and, by the plaintiff in the case at bar, 
see quotations from the Ward case on pages 19 and 20 
of appellant's brief. See also plaintiff's testimony 
on pages 16 and 17 of appellant's brief. After making 
· these comparisons, it will be seen that the facts and 
circumstances in the two cases are very similar. 
~I Point 2 
The Court erred in making its Finding of Facts 
,. numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 12, and 14, and its Conclusions 
~ of Law and Decree and all parts thereof, and the Court 
erred by its failure and refusal to niake and enter its 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
findings of fact, Con?lusions of law and Decree, holding 
that defendants had co1nmitted a breach of the contract 
an<l rescinding the sa1ne; also its failure and refusal to 
<·aneel the deed and bill of sale. 
On page 19 of respondent's brief, Counsel contends 
that plaintiff's testimony appearing on pages 24-27 of 
appellant's brief 'vas adduced in response to suggestive 
que~tions. A close examination of this testimony will 
reveal that such is not the case. 
It is also claimed that the reason 'vhy defendant 
Brinnn did not associate 'vith plaintiff from July, 1949, 
to February 10, 1950, was that plaintiff disliked hint. 
TI1e reason for her dislike, if any, no doubt sten1s from 
ltis cruel treatment of her, beginning in July 1949, and 
eontinuously thereafter until February 10, 1950, 'vhen as 
a result of defendants cruelty and neglect, plaintiff was 
obliged to leave their apartment. Her testilnony, son1e of 
'vhich appears on pages 24-27 of appellant's brief reveals 
that after the defendants had succeeded in relieving the 
plaintiff of the title and transfer of all her property, 
defendant Byron Brimm exhibited an entirely different 
attitude towards plaintiff than he did from June 8, 1948 
to July 1949. Doesn't this fit the pattern recognized 
by the courts in cases of this type~ See cases referred 
to on pages 30-34 of appellant's brief. 
It is respectfully submitted that defendant Brimm 
had a definite object in mind after defendants began to 
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liYt:' "~ith plaintiff. Plaintiff testified thnt tltey sug-
gested ~eyeral ti1ne~\ in fnet. sht> \\yas urged by· theut 
to convey and transfer her property to Hilda. And 
during this period of tilue Brinn11 \vas Yery eongenial 
\Yith ,and ~idernte of plaintiff. ~-\.nd, as Counsel :::~tates 
in respondent ·s brief\ they lived together as one happ~r 
fanlily. But after plaintiff had been relieved of all her 
property, then defendant Brin1111 began to exhibit an un-
friendly attitude and failed to c.are for or associate 
w·ith plaintiff ,,~hich later caused defendant Hilda Brimm 
to also neglect the plaintiff. 
The reaction that frequently occurs 1n cases of 
this type, and it occured in the instant case, is recognized 
by the eases-, referred to on pages 30-34 of appellant's 
brief, including -\y· ard vs. \Vard 85 P. (2d) 635. 
On page 20 of respondent's brief, Counsel attempts 
to distinguish the cases cited on page 28 of appellant's 
brief, but when those cases are examined it will be 
seen that they support the appellant in the instant case. 
It is respectfully submitted that the cases cited in appel-
lant's brief and referred to on pages 20 and 21 of 
respondent's brief, are directly in point with this case, 
even though respondent~s counsel attempts to contend 
otherwise. The fact that Counsel passes from one case 
to the next 'vith the statement that each case is disting-
uishable from the case at bar, doesn't prove that they 
are. Appellant will welcome a close examination of 
each of the cases cited on pages 35-39, of appellant's 
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brief, in which cases it will be seen that the facts closely 
re~ernble the facts in the case at bar, and they hold that 
under such facts, the contract was breached by the 
grantee. 
()n page 24 of respondent's brief, Counsel attempts 
to minimize the decision in the case of Gardner vs. Ferd-
eriek (Wash) 165 Pac. 85. by saying that,-''This case 
~in1ply stands for the rule that the court reviewed the 
evidence of the Trial Court and upheld its decision,"-
infering that the Trial Court held in favor of the gran-
tee. The facts in that case are practically identical 
w·ith the facts in the instant case, and the Trial Court 
canceled the deed. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
juchnent. See pages 37-38 of appellant's brief for review 
of that case. Likewise appellant challenges respondent's 
statement with respect to Dodge vs. Dodge (~Iich.) an-
notated in 112 A. L. R. 697. See quotation from this 
_ case on page 39 of appellant's brief. 
On page 27 of respondent's brief a quotation ap-
pears from 9 A. J. Sec. 31, Cancellation of Instruments. 
The rule therein stated does not apply to the factual 
situation presented in the instant case. The notes cited 
therein, 49 L. R. A. (NS) 1015, 25 L.R.A. (NS) 932 
and 43 L.R.A. (NS) 943, have been examined and these 
notes are predicated upon the proposition that the gran-
tees are without fault and that they have performed the 
con tract in full measure. Of course there are cases 
holding where the grantees have supported the grantor 
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for a long period of tilne and thP propert~· i~ of uloder-
ate value. a rescission of the contract has been denied. 
But of course. this principle does not apply to thP facts 
in the case at bar. 
The annotation 111 l.J.R.~\. 1917 D. 627. cited in 
respondent ~s brief. page :.?8. supports the plaintiff's 
case. The annotator :state~ that the general rule sup-
ported by the ,,~eight of authority is as follo,vs: 
"'The rule stated in the note appended to 
Dixon vs. :Jlilling Co. 43 L.R.A. 916, that, by the 
\veight of authority, "~here an agreement to sup-
port is the consideration for a conveyance of 
property it Jnust be perfornzed by the grantee, 
or the grantor nzay have the contract rescinded, 
recei,ces the support of the 1najority of the cases 
passing upon the question since this note. Thus 
it is held that equity will set aside a deed for 
breach by the grantee of his agreement to sup-
port the grantor where this ~greement formed 
the consideration for the deed. 0 'Ferrall _ vs. 
O'Ferrall (1916) 276 Ill. 132 114 N. E. 561; Berry 
vs. Heiser (1915) 271 Ill. 264, 11 N. E. 99; San-
chez vs. Sanchez (1916) N. M. 159 Pac. 669; 
Anderson vs. Reed (1915) 20 N.W. 202 L.R.A. 
1916 B, 862, 148 Pac. 502; Houston vs. Greiner 
(1914) 73 Ore. 304, 144 Pac. 133; Tysor vs. Adams 
(1914) 116 Va. 239, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1197, 81 
S. E. 76; Young vs. Young (1914} 157 Wis. 424 
147, N. W. 361. So, where the real consideration 
for a deed was an agreement by the grantee to 
support the grantor and the former not only 
breaches the agreement but denies it, equity will 
rescind the conveyance. Martin vs. Hall (1913) 
115 V. 358, 79 S. E. 320. Although no actual 
fraud is imputed to the grantee, ~evertheless, 
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equity will not sustain a conveyance the consider-
ation of which was an agreement to support the 
grantor, where the grantee failed to perform. 
Jenkins vs .• Jenkins ( 1913) 66 Ore. 12, Pac. 542. '' 
(Italics supplied) 
rrll<~ caHe of Wilson vs. Wilson (~Iich.) 125 N. W. 
:3~5, is also eited in respondent's brief page 28. In this 
case the plaintiff, an elderly woman deeded some land 
(v-alue not given) to her grandson Fred Wilson. The 
deed was dra,vn hy plaintiff's attorney and a life estate 
rt> :--:e rYe d. The action to set aside the deed was brought 
principally, if not entirely, upon the theory of fraud and 
rnistake in the execution of the deed as plaintiff test-
ified she understood that the instrun1ent she signed wa~ 
1nerely a lease. In the \\Tilson case fraud and 1nistake 
"Tas the principal charge 1nade. 
The case of ''Tillian1 vs. Lang,vill, 25 L.R.A. (NS) 
932, is cited, and Counsel says the court refused to grant 
cancellation to grantor. However, for an understanding 
of the reason for the judgn1ent rendered in that case 
it appears that John J. Evans, a 'vidower, voluntarily 
conve:Ted his farn1 to "\Villiam M. Lang,vill, a grand-
son, 20 years age. This grandson was the child of 
l\1ary J. Langwill, the only child of John J. Evans. 
Evans died and his personal representative filed suit to 
cancel the deed. The court refused to set aside the deed 
on the theory that the property was conveyed as an 
outright gift. 
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Counsel quotes fron1 the ea~e of t~ornPll v~. \Vhit-
ney 93, N. ,,~. 61.4, (~lirh.) thnt,-
-'Where the breach is not entire, and tlH~ 
grantees "yere required to pay a stated ~tun :for 
the support and Inaintenanee of the grantor so 
lono· as he continues to live a'vav fro1n the1n, ~ . 
and provide hin1 n hon1e 'vith the1n should he at 
any time desire to return. ' ' 
The foregoing rule 'vas no doubt properly applied 
in that case, but the facts therein are at eon1plete var-
iance \Yith the facts in the intant case. In that case 
the plaintiff 'vas SO years of age. He conveyed his 
property to the grantees, Septen1ber 5, 1899, and lived 
w·ith then1 in the grantor's ho1ne until ~fay, 1901. The 
undisputed evidence sho,ved that grantee perfor1necl 
every obligation under the contract. The incident that 
brought about the difficulty bet,veen the parties \vas in-
stigated by the grantor. It \Vas of a personal nature in-
volving one of the grantee's daughters 'vho had eloped. 
The plaintiff made so1ne nnproper remarks to a couple 
of visiting relatives, 'vhich were overheard by the de-
fendant's wife, and she retarted by saying some bad 
things about the plaintiff's daughter. The next morning 
the plaintiff left the defentants home and took up his 
abode with one of his children. 
Thus the undisputed evidence showed that the plain-
tiff had no complaint about the treatment he received 
at the defendants' ho1ne until he and the defendant's 
\Vife had the foregoing quarrel. He did not rescind or 
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atte1npt to rescind the contract, or request a reconvey-
HIH•,e hefore he left defendant's home. 
ri1h<-' eaHf~ of \Voolcott vs. \Voolcott (~{ich.) is cited 
on page 29 of respondent's brief. In that case the 
<'OUrt ~aid: '' v\There the breach is not of a serious char-
aeter the grantee W'ill he required to pay a definite 
arnount for the support of the grantor so long as he 
resides else,vhere than \Yith· them.'' \Vhen the facts 
jn that case are con1pared with the facts in the instant 
ease, it could, \vith propriety, be said that there was no 
breach at all in the \\1 oolcott case. 
<._;ounsel for respondent refers to the cases of 
Sprangler vs. Y araborough ( Okla) 101 Pac. 1107; Mc-
(~lelland YS. ~fcClelland (Ill.) 51 N. E. and Coy-\vendal 
vs. Kellogg (N.D.) 198 N. W. 472, cited from on page 
31-32 of appellant's brief. These cases support the pro-
position that after the conveyance the grantee and hus-
band, or wife, as the case may be, usually exhibits a 
vastly different attitude towards the grantor, as was so 
1narked in the instant case. 
The case of Simmons vs. Shafer (Kan.) 160 Pac. 
199. is cited on page 29 of respondent's brief as author-
ity for the Trial Court's decision. It will be seen, how-
ever,that there is a vast difference between the facts in 
that case and the case at bar. The facts in that case 
disclose that the plaintiff, 70 years of age, conveyed to 
a grandson, the defendants intestate, 1/2 interest in 
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certain land subject to a InortgagP thereon in the suu1 
of $600.00. The c.onsideration for the deed 'vas the pay-
Inent of the n1ortgage by the grantee and also to care for 
and support the plaintiff during the re1nainder of hi~ 
natural life. The plaintiff lived 'Yith the grantee and 
hi~ family for a period of about five. years until the 
grantee ~s death. It is adn1itted that the plaintiff found 
no fault ,vith the treatn1ent he received from the grantee 
during the latters lifetilne as appears fron1 the language 
in the opinion of tpe Kansas Supre1ne C~ourt: 
''It appears that these conditions were faith-
fully carried out for a period of about five years 
and as long as the grantee lived. During this 
period improve1nents 'vere n1ade upon the land, 
and the incmnbrance 'vas enlarged by the grantee 
and his brother, to 'vhom the other half of the 
land had been conveyed. There was no failure 
to observe its terms by either party to the con-
tract, nor were there any grounds for cancel-
ing the deed during the life time of the grantee.'' 
Respondents' counsel cites the case of Patton vs. 
Nixon, Oregon 52 Pac. 1048, (page 20 of respondents' 
brief) to support the Trial Court's judgment permitting 
Hilda to retain title to the property, on the condition 
that she pay to plaintiff a monthly stipent, which the 
court fixed atb$75.00, per month. It is submitted that 
the particular facts in the Patton case support the 
rule, but the facts in that case are vastly different from 
the facts in the case at bar, so the rule there applied 
should have no application in the instant case. The 
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contended that the property \vas conveyed to her as a 
gift hy her aged moth e r, and as stated by the 
Sup r e 111 e Court,--'' and in consideration of the 
fact that brothers and sisters of this defendant had re-
ceived large an1ounts of property from their father's 
estate, \Vhile this defendant had received nothing but 
t'vo acres of land, and in further consideration of the 
fact that this defendant had repeatedly told plaintiff 
that she \Vould furnish a home for her." The aged 
1nother lived harmoniously \Vith the defendant for about 
~!,ixteen n1on ths and \vas then taken from her hon1e 
during defendant's absence and without her knowledge, 
and ren1oved to the home of plaintiff's son-in-law where 
she ren1a]ned at time of trial. It is very likely that the 
suit \Vas instituted at the instance of the plaintiff's 
other children and in-laws. 
It is significant that in a later Oregon case, Hous-
ton vs. Greiner, 144 Pac. 133, -vvhere the facts are sinl-
ilar to t~ose in the instant case, and cancellation of the 
deed \Vas decreed, the case of Patton vs. Nixon supra. 
\vas not cited. 
Counsel also contends that the vVard case is not an 
authority for the case at bar, because it didn't cite the 
case of Chadd v. Moser, 71 Pac. 870, an earlier Utah 
case.. It is ·submitted that the facts in that case are 
I 
clearly distinguishable fro1n the facts in the Ward case, 
as well as the facts in the case at bar. The fact that the 
Chadd case was not cited or considered in the Ward 
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ea:se. is ~elf evident of the fact that it \Vas not deemed 
in point on the facts \Yith the Ward case. 
Point 3 
The court erred in 1naking its Finding of Facts, 
No. 11. and its Conclusions of LR\Y and Decree, by 
which the court has 1nodified and refor1ned the contract 
of January ~1949, entered into bet"~een the parties. 
Respondent's counsel denies that the court 1nade a 
ne"~ and d i f f e r e n t contract to the one alleged in 
paragraph five of her a1nended cornplaint. It is said 
that plaintiff doe~ not contend that Hilda should dis-
continue teaching and devote all of her time to the care 
of plaintiff. Although plaintiff did suggest that Hilda 
quit school, yet she "\vould have been satisfied had de-
fendants continued their treatment of her as prevailed 
fron1 June, 1948, to July 1949. 
There is a vast difference between the terms of 
the contract, alleged in paragraph five of the con1plaint, 
and the provisions of finding No. 11, the conclusions of 
la\v, and the decree, which provides,-"that the defend; 
ant Hilda ..... ~. Brimm is the absolute owner of the prop-
erty in question.'' As provided ·by the forgoing conclu-
sion and decree, the defendant, Hilda A. Brimm, is vest-
ed with absolute title and ownership in said property. 
The court made this provision even though plaintiff is 
yet alive and the contract of .January 25, 1949, has not 
been co1nplied \Vi th. 
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trial court in the \V ard case, 85 P. 2d 635, 'vhich reads,-
' '1.,he court further finds that the said will, if treated 
a~ a contract, does not give the defendant a present 
interest in the property h:' reason of his 1nanage1nent 
and control thereof during the lifetin1e of his 1nother 
but that there is a condition precedent to his acquir-
ing an interest in the propert~~.'' 
r-Phe courts unanin1ously hold in cases of this type, 
that the grantee holds the title as a trustee; and the 
duty to perforn1 the contract is a personal and contin-
uing one. Absolute title does not vest in the grantee, 
until the death of the grantor: Payette vs. Ferrier 
(Wash.) 55 Pac. 629. 
Said finding No. 11, the conclusion and decree 
further provides that defendants have consented and 
agreed that plaintiff n1ay live alone in her. home at 
l\Iendon, and defendants 'vill pay for her keep, includ·-
ing the reasonable cost of a lady to assist plaintiff in 
the event of her illness. Thus under the last 1nentioned 
provision of the Court's decree) defendants have been 
relieved of all personal care. 
rrhe cases hold that the consideration for a deed 
of this character becomes a personal and continuing 
duty; and the courts further emphasize that colnpanion-
ship, kindly and affectionate treatment form the prin-
cipal elements in the consideration for a contract of 
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this type: and strict perforn1ance rests upon the grantee 
to disehargt> thi~ contract personally, and cannot be 
annulled, shifted or transferred to another. See cases 
listed on pages -!6--tS of appellant ~s brief. But unde1· 
the conclusions and decree, the defendants are no"· 
1nerely obligated to pay $75.00 per 1nonth for plahl-
tiff 's support, \\-rhich does not exceed the rental value 
of the property. Thus, the court has transferred to 
Hilda, a valuable property, without paying_ therefor, or 
rendering any services 'vhatsoever to the plaintiff, in 
con1plete contravention of the terms of the adn1itted con-
tract entered into bet,veen the parties on January 25, 
1949. 
Counsel states (page 32) that it is apparent fron1 
the record that the court took great pains in arriving 
at it decision. This is rather doubtful, in viev.r of the 
fact that the court permitted the defendants to dictate 
the decision by the filing of their so-called election. 
But regardless of 'vhether the court took great pains, 
it is earnestly contended that the decision is inequit-
able~ unjust, illegal, and erroneous from every con-
ceivable standpoint. 
Point 4 
The Court erred in making its Finding of Fact 
numbers 6, 7, 11, 13, and making and entering its Con-
clusions of law and Decree; in permitting the amended 
answer to be filed to include consideration of Idaho 
transaction; (Tr. 161) in receiving evidence over plain-
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tiff's objection in relation thereto; (Tr. 245) denying 
plaintiff's n1otion of August 3, 1950; (Tr. 52) and deny-
Ing· plaintiff's n1otion of ~'\ ugust 24, 1950. 
Coun~el for respondents entirely ignores the fact 
that the purported assign1nents fnnn plaintiff to Hilda 
of the Idaho 1nortgage, (Def's Ex. 3) was filed of reeord 
in Pow'er County, Idaho, on ~larch 3, 1949, and re-
corded in Book 83 of Assignn1ents at page 68. As the 
record stands \vith respect to that Inortgage, the de 
fendant, Hilda Bri1nn1, is the o\vner of the san1e by 
virtue of said assign1nent. Plaintiff has filed an ac-
tion in I:>o,ver County, Idaho, to cancel the aforesaid 
assign1nent, and has acquired jurisdiction of the de-
fettdants by service of su1nn1ons on June 12, 1950. This 
Is conceded by respondents. 
Counsel for respondent further contends (page :34 
of brief) that,-'' a note and mortgage and the assign-
Inent thereof is person~l property, and the dispute over 
the o\vnership thereof is an action in personam." If 
the said assignn1ent ( Def 's Ex. 3) had not been filed of 
record, Counsel's contention 1night be sound. But, as 
the as~ign1nent has been filed of record with the County 
Recorder of Po,ver County, Idaho, affecting the title 
to Idaho property, it then becomes an , action in rein. 
A Utah court would have no right to 1nake an order 
affecting title to real property situated in the State of 
Idaho. Jensen vs. Jensen, (Wash.) 147 P. 2d. 512. 
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The cases and the lTtah Rule~ of civil proePdnrP 
cited on page 34 of respondent,~ brief are not in point. 
Thev deal w·ith the ~nbject of splitting eauses of action 
involved in one transaction. But this i~ not a ea~~~ 
'vhere there is an atte1npt to split a single contract into 
~eYeral causes of~ action. The transaction involving-
plaintiff's signing the purported assignn1ent is one 
transaction in and of itself. It has no relationship to 
and, is not a part of, any other transaction included 
in plaintiff's a1nended con1plaint or ainendinents therP-
to. The cases and authorities cited and referred to on 
pages 35 and 36 of respondent's brief relate to actions 
111 personam. None of them affect title to real estate. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion of respondent's brief, counsel states 
that respondents have sustained a loss in con1ing to 
to Mendon to care for the p l a i n t i f f. It is 
respectfully submitted that counsel's contention is 
r e f u t e d by the r e c o r d. At the time defend~ 
ants ca1ne to Mendon in J nne 1948, Hilda had just con-
cluded teaching school for the school year of 194 7 ~1948, 
and defendant Brimm admitted that at that time he 
didn't have a job and hadn't worked for about nine 
tnonths prior thereto, because he 'vas suffering fron1 
arthritis. (Tr. 456) Therefore, he 'vas afforded an 
opportunity to manage the farm and hire the labor, 
'vhich he did for the 1nost part during the year 1948. 
rrhe record shows that Hilda is still teaching school and 
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~ during the current school year. 
during the two school years-1948-1949 and 1949-1950-
she earned $6150.00, (rrr. 357) and she is no"\v teaching~ 
And the record shows that defendants \Vhen coining 
to Mendon in 1948 didn't intend to live there permanent-
ly as Hilda expected to teach school. In fact, Hilda has 
lived there only during the sum1ners of 1948-1949, \vhile 
she \Vas taking care of the plaintiff. It therefore def .. 
initely appears that Hilda's inco1ne or e1nployment has 
not been in any wise affected, and Byron, not having a 
job \vhen the defendants came to Mendon, \Vas given 
light work, and it was an opportunity for him, be-
cause in all probability he 'vould not have been in a 
condition to work for a considerable period of time. 
And 1noreover, defendants did not have a car at 
that time so con1ing to plaintiff's home gave them inl-
Inediate access to her car which they used continuously 
until about l\{arch 1, 1950. ( Tr. 357) The defendants have 
also enjoyed the use of defendant's checking account, 
from which there was withdrawn by checks between June 
8, 1948 and September 10, 1949, the su1n of $3,137.74, 
"\vhich money was used for household, hospital, medical, 
and miscellaneous expenses. And during the same 
period of time, there "\vas withdrawn from plaintiff's 
savings account $3,008.50 of which $2,000 was paid to 
John C. Anderson for his 1/9 interest in the real prop-
erty, and the balance of $1,008.50 was spent for house-
hold, hospital, and miscellaneous expenses. 
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The defendant~ also ~harerl 'vith plaintiff the in~ 
corne frorn the crop of 1948 "rhich a1nounted to $1,660.34 
and 'vhich \vas deposited to plaintiff's ehecking account 
and becarne a part of the total sunt of $3,137.74 above 
1nentioned. ...-\nd the defendants haYe had the exclusive 
incorne fron1 the farrn crops for the t"~o years of 1949 and 
1950, no part of \vhicl1 \Yas received or enjoyed b:- the 
plaintiff. 
This gives the court a surnn1ary of ho"r defendant~ 
haYe been affected during the period of tirne in question. 
It is respectfully subn1itted that the \vriter has not found 
a case, and it is doubtful that a case can be found which 
1natehes the expenditures n1ade hy a grantor during the 
short period of ti1ne the parties lived together in this 
case. It "\vill also be remembered that "\vhen 
the plaintiff \vas obliged to leave the defenants' apart-
ment on February 10, 1950, she had only thirty cents. 
It is respectfully submitted that from the foregoing, it 
\vill appear that defendants have not sustained any fi-
nancial losses. 
The appellant respectfully submits to this Honor-
able Court that the findings, conclusions, and judg-
Inent of the trial court be reversed, remanding the case 
and directing that the trial court enter findings, con-
clusions and decree, canceling the deed and bill of sale ; 
and to enter such judgrnent with respect to the other 
rauses of action as equity and justice bet,veen the parties 
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'vill dictate, and to elilninate the issues involved in the 
Idaho case, and that plaintiff be a\varded costs on this 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted 
I.J. E. NELSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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